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Abstract

propose three regression functions to estimate partners’
behaviors in multi-agent negotiation in this paper, which
are linear, power and quadratic regression function. According to our literature review, this is the first time that the
regression analysis approach is employed into the partners’
behaviors prediction. The proposed approach only uses
the historical offers in the current negotiation and does
not require any additional training process. Also, because
the proposed approach does not make any assumption on
agents’ purposes, preferences and negotiation strategies, it
can be employed widely in negotiation by different types
of agents.
The rest paper is organized as follows: Section II introduces the three proposed regression functions, respectively;
Section III illustrates the performance of the proposed
regression functions through experiments; Section IV lists
some related work; and Section V concludes this paper
and outlines future works.

Prediction of partners’ behaviors in negotiation has
been an active research direction in recent years in the
area of multi-agent and agent system. So by employing the
prediction results, agents can modify their own negotiation
strategies in order to achieve an agreement much quicker
or to look after much higher benefits. Even though some of
prediction strategies have been proposed by researchers,
most of them are based on machine learning mechanisms
which require a training process in advance. However,
in most circumstances, the machine learning approaches
might not work well for some kinds of agents whose
behaviors are excluded in the training data. In order to
address this issue, we propose three regression functions
to predict agents’ behaviors in this paper, which are
linear, power and quadratic regression functions. The
experimental results illustrate that the proposed functions
can estimate partners’ potential behaviors successfully and
efficiently in different circumstances.

II. Regression Analysis in Agent Negotiation
In this section, we introduce three different regression
functions in detail for the prediction of partners’ behaviors during negotiation. The proposed approach is covers
most of general agents’ negotiation behaviors, which are
conceder, linear and boulware [3].

I. Introduction
Negotiation is a means for agents to communicate and
compromise to reach mutually beneficial agreements [5].
One of the crucial issues in negotiation is how to predict
partners’ behaviors and use the prediction results to maximum agents’ own benefits. Up to now, several prediction
strategies [6] [2] have been proposed by researchers, and
machine learning is one of the most popular mechanisms.
However, the existing machine learning approaches may
not work well in some more flexible application domains
for the reasons of (1) lacking of sufficient data to train
the system, and (2) requesting plenty of time and space
resources during the training process.
In order to address the issues mentioned above, we
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A. Linear Regression Function
We propose the linear regression function as follows:
u=b×t+a

(1)

where u denotes the estimated value for an agent’s
utility, t (0 ≤ t ≤ τ ) denotes the negotiation time and
a, b are the parameters which need to be calculated. Both
parameters a and b are independent on t.
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Let pairs (t0 , uˆ0 ), . . . , (tn , uˆn ) are the instances in the
current negotiation, where ti (ti < ti+1 ) indicates the
ˆ ) indicates the real
negotiation cycle and ûi (ûi ≤ ui+1
utility value the agent gained from its partners. Let ε
is the difference between ui and ûi , because for each
ûi = b × ti + a + εi , εi ∼ N (0, σ 2 ), ûi is distinctive,
then the joint probability density function for ûi is:

by employing the steps mentioned in the Subsection IIA (recall Equations 2 to 5), we can get solutions for
parameter b and a as follows:
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C. Quadratic Regression Function
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In this subsection, a quadratic regression function is
proposed to predict agents’ behaviors as follows:
u = a × t2 + b × t + c

Let x = t2 and y = t, then the Equation 10 is
transferred to a linear function as u = a × x + b × y + c.
The joint probability density function for the difference
between the predicted value ui and the real value ûi is:

PnIn order to make 2L to achieve its maximum, obviously
i=1 (ûi − bti − a) should achieve its minimum value.
Let
Q(a, b) =

n
X

(ûi − bti − a)2

(3)
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L

We calculate the first-order partial derivative for Q(a, b)
on a and b, and let the results equal to zero as follows:
(
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Then it equals:
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Equation 13 can be rewritten as follows:

i=1

 Pn
Pn
Pn
Pn
2

(Pi=1 xi )a + ( P
i=1 xi yi )b + (
i=1 xi )c =
i=1 xi ûi
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Then let

For the power regression, we propose the regression
function as follows:
u = a × tb

(7)

Firstly, we do the equivalence transformation on Equation 7:
ln(u) = ln(a × tb ) = ln(a) + b × ln(t)
∗

(ûi − axi − byi − c)2

We calculate the first-order partial derivative for
Q(a, b, c) on a, b and c, and let the results equal to zero.

B. Power Regression Function

∗

n
X
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Because the P
value of Equation 5’s coefficient matrix is
P
n
n
(n i=1 t2i − ( i=1 ti )2 ) and does not equal zero. Both
parameters a and b have an unique solution, which is
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∗

Let u = ln(u), a = ln(a) and t = ln(t), the
Equation 8 can be rewritten as u∗ = a∗ + b × t∗ . Then
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Pi=1
n
i=1
Pn yi ûi
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Because P U 6= 0, so parameters a, b and c have an
A
PC
, b = PP B
unique solution, which is a = PP U
U and c = P U .

Fig. 1. Prediction results for scenario 1

III. Experiments
In this section, we demonstrate three scenarios to test
our proposed approaches. In order to simplify the implementation process, all agents in the experiment employ
the NDF negotiation strategy [3]. Agents’ negotiation
behaviors cover all general possible situations, which are
conceder, linear and boulware.
Pi In the experiment, we use
the average error (AEi = k=1 (ûi − ui )/i, where i is
the negotiation cycle) to evaluate the experimental results.
The AEi indicates the difference between the estimated
results and the real value. The smaller the value of AEi ,
the better the prediction result.

Fig. 2. Prediction results for scenario 2

better regression curve to decrease the average error, but
not to provide more accurate values in some particular
negotiation cycles.

A. Scenario 1
In the first scenario, a buyer wants to purchase a mouse
pad from a seller. The acceptable price for the buyer is
in [$0, $1.4]. The deadline for the buyer to finish this
purchasing process is 11th cycles. In this experiment, the
buyer adopts conceder negotiation behavior, and the seller
employs the proposed approaches to estimate the buyer’s
price. The estimated results are displayed in Figure 1.
It can be seen that the linear approach dose not fit
the instances very well, because it can only estimate the
main trend of the buyer’s offers but cannot provide more
accurate values. The average error for the linear function
l
= 0.0189, which is 1.35% of the buyer’s reserve
is AE10
price.
To contrast, the power approach provides more accurate
prediction results. According to the Figure 1, the prediction
results almost fit all real price except the 4th and 5th negotiation cycles. The average error for the power approach
p
= 0.0165, which is 1.17% of the buyer’s highest
is AE10
price.
The quadratic function’s curve is in the middle of other
two curves. Even though the quadratic function looks
no better than the power function, the average error of
q
= 0.0147),
the quadratic approach is the lowest (AE10
which is only 1.05% of the buyer’s reserve price. The
reason is because the quadratic approach aim to find a

B. Scenario 2
In the second scenario, a buyer wants to buy a keyboard
from a seller. The desired price for the buyer is in [$0, $14].
We let the buyer to employ the linear negotiation strategy.
The prediction results are shown in Figure 2.
It can be seen that when the buyer employ the linear negotiation strategy, the prediction results by using the three
proposed approaches are almost same. A little differences
appear in the 3rd , 4th , 9th and 10th negotiation cycles.
The average errors for the linear, power and quadratic
p
q
l
= 0.256, AE10
= 0.341 and AE10
=
functions are AE10
0.241, respectively. Therefore, we can still conclude that all
proposed regression function perform very well when the
buyer employs linear negotiation strategy and the quadratic
approach outperforms other two approaches a little bit.

C. Scenario 3
In the third scenario, a buyer wants to purchase a
monitor from a seller. The suitable price for the buyer is in
[$0, $250] and the buyer employs the boulware negotiation
strategy.
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authors assumed that each agent is rational and looks for
maximum benefits during negotiation. Since this approach
requires that all possible negotiation endings and the corresponding probabilities should be estimated in advance,
its application may be limited when the variance of negotiation issues is discrete or the negotiation environment is
open and dynamic.
Brzostowski and Kowalczyk [1] presented a way to
estimate partners’ behaviors by employing a classification
method. However, their approach only works for the timedependent agent and the behavior-dependent agent, which
limits its application domains.
By comparing with the above approaches, our proposed
approach will have more wide application domains because
it can estimate partners’ behaviors based only on the
current historical records so as to save both space and
time resources. Therefore, the proposed functions can be
employed by agents in open and dynamic negotiation
environments to predict partners’ behaviors and to modify
agents’ own negotiation strategies.

Fig. 3. Prediction results for scenario 3
The prediction results are shown in Figure 3. It can
be seen that the linear approach performs much worse
than other two proposed approaches. In actually, only one
prediction result (the 3rd negotiation cycle) in the linear
function is same as the real value. The average error for
the linear function is EAl10 = 19.872, which is 7.94% of
the buyer’s reserve price.
In contrast, both the power and quadratic functions give
more accurate prediction results. Especially, the quadratic
function almost fits all real prices except the 4th and
8th negotiation cycles. The prediction results by using
the power regression approach is also accurate enough
to illustrate the buyer’s negotiation strategy. According to
experimental results, the average error for the power function is EAp10 = 5.196 (i.e. 2.08% of the buyer’s reserve
price) and the average error for the quadratic function is
EAq10 = 4.071 (i.e. 1.63% of the buyer’s reserve price).
Therefore, we can conclude that the quadratic approach
also outperform other two approaches when the buyer’s
negotiation strategy is boulware, and both the quadratic
and power approaches can give very accurate prediction
results.
From these experimental results in the above, we can
conclude that the proposed regression functions can estimate partners’ potential behaviors successfully in different
circumstances, and also the estimation results are accurate
and reasonable enough to be adopted by agents to modify
their strategies during negotiation.

V. Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we proposed three regression functions
to estimate partners’ behaviors in negotiation. The experimental results demonstrated that the proposed approach
is novel and valuable for the agents’ behaviors prediction
because it is the first time that the regression analysis
approach is applied on this research area. This approach is
also very suitable to work in open and dynamic negotiation
environments. The future work includes to extend current
approach to handel multi-issue negotiation and to test it in
real world applications.
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IV. Related Work
In this section, we list some related works. In [4], Gal
and Pfeffer presented a machine learning approach based
on a statistical method. The limitation of this approach
is the difficult of training the proposed system perfectly.
Therefore, for some unknown kind of agents whose behaviors are excluded in the training data, the prediction result
may not reach the acceptable accuracy requirements.
Chajewska et. al. [2] proposed a decision-tree approach
to learn and to estimate agents’ utility functions. The
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